ible, a large Bulgaria, a weak Montenegro,
a small Serbia and a free Albania. The Dual Monarchy would, as Golochowski
believed, sooner engage into war than allow for the creation of a great
Serbia or a great Montenegro.11
Succeeding to the throne following the killing of King Aleksandar
Obrenovic (1903), was Petar I Karadjordjevic (1903-1921). The personal
regimes of the last Obrenovices were replaced by the parliamentary monarchy.
The democracy activated a huge political, national and intellectual
potential that was unable to take full swing during the previous regimes.
The termination of dependence upon Austria-Hungary marked an acute turnover
in Serbia's foreign policy, which, relying upon Russia, set off to struggle
for national liberation and the unification of the Serbian people. Conflict
with Austria-Hungary began immediately with the reform issues in Turkey.
The reform action that was to have been implemented in the European
provinces of the Ottoman Empire with the supervision of the Great Powers,
was considered by the Serbs of Kosovo and Metohia a benefical solution
against Albanian terror. Russia intended to secure supervision for itself on
the reforms in Kosovo and Metohia, but the plan was soon thwarted. At
Austria-Hungary's demand, at the beginning of 1904, the Northwest parts of
the Kosovo vilayet, i.e. Kosovo and Metohia, were excluded from the reform
action, explained as being one of an admixed population.12
The ethnic Albanians won a great victory with the exclusion of Kosovo
and Metohia from the reform action; there was nothing to intercede their
supremacy and unhamper their dealings with the Serbs. Left to fate, the
Serbs remained the victims of a privileged ethnic populace. The years 1904
and 1905 are remembered by the unheard-of oppression upon the Serbian
population. Turkish authorities undertook no measures whatsoever, the Porte
would not heed the notes of protest sent by the Serbian government. Occupied
with internal unrest and conflicts in the Far East, Russia was unable to
support Serbian protests more decisively. Serbia tried in vain to establish
contact with the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. In Belgrade, the paper Albania
was inaugurated to propagate Serbian-Albanian amicability, while Nikola
Pasic strove to find adversaries of Austro-Hungarian propaganda among
notables in Metohia. Finding no way to come to any agreement with tribal and
feudal notables, the Serbian government paid some Albanian outlaws to
protect Serbian villages in Metohia; since 1903 Montenegro also requited
ethnic Albanians to protect the Serbs.13
The consul to Pristina, Miroslav Spalajkovic, reported at the end of
June 1905, "there was not a day that one or two murders of Serbs were
committed" in Kosovo and Metohia, adding that "nothing was done to stop
Albanian banditry". He was particularly worried since "the reform forces pay
absolutely no attention to these regions". Russian consul to Mitrovica, A.
A. Orlov, assured him he was sending daily reports to the embassy on the
situation in Kosovo and Metohia, but it showed no interest. Believing the
Albanian misdeeds had gone too far, Spalajkovic proposed to the government
to find a way "to interest the public of Russia, England and France in the
wretched situation of Serbs in Old Serbia" and proposed to jar, through the
press, "the passiveness and gross negligence of the official delegates of
Great Powers, whose attention has now been solely diverted to
Macedonia".14
Stretching from the Pec nahi to the plains of Kosovo and the gorge of
Kacanik, the ethnic Albanians, fearing no sanctions, robbed, blackmailed,
routed and killed the Serbian populace mostly in villages and on roads.
During 1904, from Kosovo alone 108 persons fled to Serbia.15 The
Serbian consulate in Pristina composed a detailed list of crimes committed
upon the Serbs in 1906 - with names of the perpetrators, victims and types
of oppression. In 1904, of 136 different crimes noted, 46 ended with murder.
Many houses, crops and barns were burned, many people beaten and robbed,
without sparing the children. A group of ethnic Albanians raped a
seven-year-old girl. In 1905, from 281 cases of oppression, 65 Serbs were
killed (at a wedding alone, recalcitrant outlaws killed nine of
them).16 Reports from Serbian agents and consuls display that
Fandas and Catholic ethnic Albanians, standing under the direct control of
Austro-Hungarian propaganda, exceeded in the crimes.17
Pec and its neighboring regions suffered the most since there was no
Serbian consulate nor foreign power which would, at least just by being
there, somewhat lessen the crimes committed in the town and its immediate
vicinity. In a complaint lodged to the consul, the Serbs of Pec reported
that Albanian chiefs forbade their compatriots to protect the Serbs, "and to
place komitadjis of 2-12 men in every village, so whenever they come across
a Serb they do away with him".18 Rector of the Seminary in
Prizren sent a list to the consulate in Pristina in 1906, containing the
victims of violence under the ethnic Albanians of Pec and the vicinity - 38
murdered and five wounded in 1905; within the first three months of 1906,
three murdered and one wounded. The perpetrators "of the committed crimes
suffered no punishment whatsoever from the Turkish state
authorities".19
The Serbs of Mitrovica appealed to King Petar I in 1905, entreating for
a Serbian consulate to be opened in the town for their protection, adding
that if the present situation were to continue, the Serbs would disappear
from these areas. Emphasis was put on the short-lived joy for the expected
introduction of reforms, which incurred "intensified Albanian hostility
toward the Serbs", and, "there is not a single day when a Serb is not swept
from the face of this earth, often many are; we cannot count the number of
robberies and ordinary fights, there are too many of them".20
In summer 1905, Spalajkovic decided to visit Pec and its vicinity with
two officials from the consulate, to convince himself of the horrid news
arriving from there. Turkish authorities attempted to intimidate them with
stories of Albanian ambushes on the roads. Milan Rakic penned in a private
letter: "! should not forget my entering Pec for quite some time. First the
passage through the Turkish quarter and downtown full of somber ethnic
Albanians, a shuddering and ominous silence, then through the Serbian
quarter, full of people, especially children and women yelling "welcome",
throwing flowers at us and crying."21 The Turkish authorities
forbade the Serbs and ethnic Albanians to visit the consul and talk to him,
thus the Serbian diplomats returned to Pristina without accomplishing their
task.22
The external political situation did not allow for Serbia to undertake
greater national action in Old Serbia. Demands for the inclusion of Kosovo
and Metohia in the reform actions were constantly sent to the Great powers.
The aggravated position of the Serbs evinced the necessity to undertake
measures for protecting the inhabitants, beside the educational-political
action, which had achieved good results with its activities at schools and
the restoration of churches. When it had become clear that due to
Austro-Hungarian influence, endeavors to inaugurate reforms in the
northwestern parts of the regions would not succeed, the alternative was to
secretly arm those villages inflicted the most.
Under the private initiative of several notable and wealthy citizens of
Belgrade who organized the first company, comprised of patriot volunteers
and refugees from Old Serbia and Macedonia, to fight Bulgarian komitadjis in
Macedonia in 1902, chetnik action came under the wing of the state gained
further swing in 1904. Kosovo and Metohia were not encompassed by the
chetnik action, although it did instigate organized arms delivery to the
most imperilled Serbian villages. When a chetnik detachment was passing
through Metohia on its way to Macedonia, in 1905, it was discovered and
killed in the village Velika Hoca, the home-town of its leader Lazar
Kujundzic. Fear of mass Albanian vengeance encroached upon the Serbs, thus
compelling Kujundzic's mother to deny the murder of her son before the
authorities. At the demand of Albanian tribes, the houses assisting the
komitadjis were burned in retribution; frightened by the emergence of the
Serbian company, ethnic Albanians were ready to search Serbian villages,
those that resisted would be burnt and their chiefs killed.23
In summer 1907, another Serbian company passed through Kosovo and was
received by the locals of the Pasjane village. It was soon discovered, and
was destroyed following a pitched battle with the ethnic Albanians and
Turks. The discovery of komitadjis vexed the ethnic Albanians who feared the
expansion of chetnik action and the inclusion of Kosovo and Metohia in the
reform action. Feuding Albanian tribes immediately expressed solidarity.
After confirming their besa, together they set off to search Serbian
villages; many innocent people died in the pursuit for komitadjis and hidden
arms.24 An assembly was held in the large mosque of Prizren; the
ethnic Albanians of Ljuma demanded the extermination of Serbs. Milan Rakic
discovered the demands of the people in Ljuma: "[...] for the assembly to
determine the day when all ethnic Albanians would rise in arms and carry out
a general massacre of Serbs. The reason stated by the people of Ljuma for
the extermination of Serbs was that peace among the ethnic Albanians was
impossible as long as there were Serbs in these regions, since the Serbs
were always complaining to foreigners, bringing about bidats - reforms -
with their complaints, and recently, they had started to infiltrate
companies from Serbia."25 The assembly decided that the Serbs
were to be killed secretly, one by one; Albanian companies were to be formed
to rout the chetniks from Serbia, and attacks upon Serbian state territory
would be repeated in retribution. New persecutions ensued
immediately.26
Complaints from Pec, Vucitrn, Gnjilane and other regions in Kosovo
showered the Serbian government and its consulates in Pristina and Skoplje.
The ecclesiastical-educational community and fraternity of the Pec monastery
sent an elaborate petition to the Montenegrin government in 1907, demanding
Montenegro and Serbia to open a consulate for the protection of the people:
"In the town of Pec there are 500 houses at most and around 4,000
Orthodox souls; the Pec nahi numbers around 1,200 homes plus, amounting to
about 16,000 souls of Serbian nationality. Together with Djakovica and its
vicinity, the number totals around 20,000 souls plus. It is known - and
people still remember, that during the past 25 years the same number of
families and souls were moved out, mostly to Serbia, and many died, all due
to oppression under the fanatical savage ethnic Albanians - Muslims and the
rotten savage Fandas, who are of Catholic faith [...] They are the most
dangerous evildoers, haiduks and oppressors, who are systematically
eradicating the Serbs from these regions; forcing them to move; killing them
like wild animals; burning their houses, barns, villages and mercilessly
stealing their food, seizing, plundering, fleecing - blackmails of 2,5,10,
20 and 50 Turkish liras; abducting men, women, children and girls to
slavery. Well, those are the means through which they operate. In this
manner alone, the Fandas came from that savage Malissia and settled more
than 300 houses during the past 20 years, arriving naked and barefoot, while
today most of them are wealthy men; on account of settling on the
foundations of Serbian houses, occupying Serbian homes, fields and pastures,
while still robbing and taking by force. There is also oppression upon the
Serbs under Fandas and ethnic Albanians, most of which were Turkized
60,100-200 years ago on account of the oppression, to keep their
lands."27
Montenegro failed to open its consulate in Pec. Serbia strove for at
least one of the Great Powers (Russia, Great Britain or France), to open a
consulate in Pec, but this initiative bore no fruit either.28 The
Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made several proposals to establish
contact with the ethnic Albanians, but none were adopted, since all attempts
performed on terrains soon failed. Even the plan of vice-consul Milan Rakic
had no visible effect; in 1907, he believed the best solution was to place
Albanian guards over Serbian villages.29
Violence ceased intermittently, particularly in 1907 when
Austria-Hungary aimed to expand the reform action to the Presevo and
Gnjilane districts, ethnic Albanians began to abhor the expansion of
Austro-Hungarian influence which seriously threatened to imperil their
supremacy in Old Serbia. News of the Austro-Hungarian army arriving in
Kosovo brought several thousand ethnic Albanians together in Ferizovic
simultaneous to the breaking out of the Young Turk Revolution. Tribal chiefs
arrived from all regions of Kosovo and Metohia. The conference lasted two
weeks, and due to the agitation of the Young Turks, a telegram was sent from
the conference to the sultan, demanding the restoration of the
constitution.30
1 P.O. (S. St. Simic), Pitanje o Staroj Srbiji, Beograd 1901.
2 V. Stojancevic, Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta, pp.
314-315.
3 V. Corovic, op. cit., 18-19; Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp.
323-324.
4 V. Stojancevic, Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta, pp.
31, 317-325.
5 G. Gaulis, La mine d'une Empire, Abdul-Hamid ses amis et ses peuples,
Paris 1913, 325-326; details 325-356; V. Berard, La Macedoine, 101-125;
ibid., Pro Macedonia, Paris 1904; ibid, La mart du Stamboul, Paris 1913. Cf.
D. T. Batakovic, Les Francois et la Vielle Serbie, in: Rapports
franco-yougoslave, Zb. radova Istorijskog instituta, vol. 10, Belgrade
J1989, pp. 138-150
6 D. T. Batakovic, Pogibija ruskog konzula G. S. Scerbine u Mitrovici
1903. godine, Istorijski casopis, XXXIV (1987), pp. 311-312 (with older
bibliography); S. Martinovic, Decembarski i Becki program reformi u Turskoj
1902/1903. godine i stav Rusije prema Albancima, Obelezja, 3 (1985), 63.
7 V. Corovic, Diplomatska prepiska Kraljevine Srbije, I, Beograd 1933,
597-599, cf. British documentation in: Further correspondence Respecting The
Affairs Of South-Eastern Europe, Turkey, 3 (1903), London 1903.
8 D. T. Batakovic, Pogibija ruskog konzula G. S. Scerbine, pp. 312-313.
9 Ibid., p. 318-319.
10 Ibid., p. 320-323.
11 V. Corovic, Borba za nezavisnost Balkana, Beograd 1937, pp. 123-125.
12 B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago i begova, pp. 306-312.
13 Conflicts among clans in Metohia did not abate. At one moment Bairam
and Murtez Cur sent a message to King Petar I that he and 10,000 fellow
tribesmen from the Krasnici clan were enemies of Austria-Hungary. The offer
to cooperate was not accepted. See: Dj. Mikic, Albansko pitanje i
srpsko-albanske veze u XIX veku (do 1912), pp. 150-151.
14 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, pp. 267-269.
15 Ibid., pp. 227-228.
16 Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 672-690.
17 Ibid., pp. 696-197; B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago. i begova, pp. 350-355.
18 Zaduzbine Kosova, p 672-690.
19 Ibid, p. 697; settlements were one of the reasons for emigration
from the Kosovo vilayet to the USA: J. Pejin, Iseljavanje iz kosovskog
vilajeta i drugih krajeva pod Turcima u SAD 1906-1907 godine, Istorijski
glasnik, 1-2 (1985), pp. 49-54.
20 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, pp. 255.
21 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, pp. 55-56, cf. B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo
o Kosovu 1901-1913, 252-253; Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji, pp. 374-375.
22 M. Rakic, op. cit., pp. 57-60, 315-317; Savremenici o Kosovu i
Metohiji, pp. 374-376.
23 M. Rakic, op. cit., pp. 41-46, 304-313, a considerable number of
literary works wrote about the killing of the company and the heroic act of
Lazar Kujundzic's mother. The most reknown is a drama called Lazarevo
vaskrsenje, by Serbian literary Ivo Vojnovic from Dubrovnik.
24 M. Rakic, op. cit., pp. 131-136,138.
25 Ibid., p. 135.
26 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
27 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, p. 289.
28 D. Mikic, Nastojanje Srba na otvaranju ruskog ill engleskog
konzulata u Fed 1908. godine, pp. 161-165.
29 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, pp. 94-106.
30 Z. Avramovski, Izvestaji austrougarskih konzula u Kosovskoj
Mitrovici, Prizrenu i Skoplju o odrzanoj skupstini u Ferizovicu, Godisnjak
Arhiva Kosova, II-III (1970), pp. 310-330; B. Hrabak, Kosovo prema
mladoturskoj revoluciji 1908, Obelezja, 5 (1974), pp. 108-126.

Young Turk Regime
The Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the proclamation of Bulgaria's independence, essentially
altered the balance of forces in the Balkans. The reform action of the Great
Powers had ceased. The Young Turks restored the Constitution of 1876,
proclaimed equality of all subjects of the empire, regardless of religion
and nationality, and announced radical political and social reforms. The
promises of the Young Turks were greeted by the Serbs as an opportunity for
national affirmation and free political organization. In Skoplje, seat of
the Kosovo vilayet, the Serbian Democratic League was formed on August 10,
with a temporary central committee presided over by Bogdan Radenkovic. The
formation of district committees ensued immediately at meetings in Pristina,
Vucitrn, Mitrovica, Gnjilane and Urosevac, of which the most distinguished
national representatives, teachers, priests, craftsmen and merchants were a
part. The paper Vardar was founded in Skoplje to propagate the principles of
the League, writing on the position of Serbs. Vardar devoted special
attention to oppression, because after the expiration of the besa confirmed
in Ferizovic, the ethnic Albanians again began to assail the Serbs. The
League and the paper pledged for the decrees of the constitution to be
applied upon ethnic Albanians as well, who recognized the new regime but
displayed no readiness to support the law.1
Having reached an agreement with the Young Turks, the Serbs stated
their candidates in several districts to the election campaign for the
Turkish Parliament. In Kosovo and Metohia they aimed to become candidates
for envoys in the Pec, Prizren and Pristina sanjaks, but the mandate was
received only in Pristina where Sava Stojanovic was elected. At the assembly
in Constantinople (272 seats), two more Serbian envoys entered, from Skoplje
(Aleksandar Parlic) and Bitolj (Dr. Janicije Dimitrijevic), while Temko
Popovic of Ohrid was elected senator.2 A large assembly of
Ottoman Serbs was held in Skoplje on the Visitation of the Virgin in 1909,
with 78 delegates present, 44 from Old Serbia and 34 from Macedonia; the
Organization of the Serbian People in the Ottoman Empire was established,
which was to grow into a representative body of all the Serbs in the Ottoman
Empire.3
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, by which the decrees
of the Berlin Congress were partially violated, and the project to build a
railway through the Novi Pazar sanjak, announced the unconcealed purpose of
Austria-Hungary to rule the Balkan Peninsula. The meetings held against the
annexation were attended also by ethnic Albanians. Frightened by
Austro-Hungarian aspirations, many Albanian notables made attempts to
approach the Serbs.4 Bairam Cur of Djakovica proposed to Bogdan
Radenkovic a joint confrontation to the annexation, while the
Mahmudbegovices of Pec negotiated with Serbian diplomats. Simultaneously
though, Austro-Hungarian followers among the ethnic Albanians severely
opposed this approach toward the Serbs. While comparative peace reigned in
Gnjilane and Pristina, oppression upon the Serbs in the Pec nahi continued.
The ethnic Albanians spoke in a threatening voice that the proclamation of
the constitution was only temporary and that they would never allow the
infidels (djaurs) to enjoy the same rights as the Muslims.5
Notwithstanding individual crimes, the situation in Kosovo and Metohia
was tolerable until the unsuccessful coup d'etat in Constantinople, in April
1909. Abdulhamid II attempted to depose the Young Turks, and, having been
defeated, was compelled to renounce the throne. His brother Mahmud V Reshad
was proclaimed sultan. Within the Young Turk leadership, a pan-Ottoman
inclination prevailed, which considered all subjects of the empire an
inseparable Ottoman whole. The Serbian organization was renamed the
Educational-Charitable Organization of Ottoman Serbs, but its operation was
soon limited. Under various decrees and laws, the activities of many Serbian
societies were forbidden, lands were confiscated from churches and
monasteries, the work of schools and religious committees was hindered. The
law on the exchange of deeds and the inheritance of estates greatly upset
the Serbs, since many of the real owners fled to Serbia in the preceding
period. Many of the estates were divided among the muhadjirs (Muslims who
settled in Kosovo after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The new
laws also upset chiflik farmers, whom the agas could drive off the land and
settle Muslims instead, or exact double taxes.6
At the beginning of the Young Turk reign, ethnic Albanians, like other
peoples in Turkey, founded national clubs and educational societies that
became seats of national congregation and political agitation. Autonomist
inclinations revived. The pan-Ottoman ideology of the Young Turk leadership,
centralization of administration, introduction of regular military service
and a new tax policy ruffled the ethnic Albanians. Instead of protection
from Abdulhamid II who tolerated anarchy, they were confronted with the
resolute Young Turks who had no understanding for their special rights. The
first conflicts in Kosovo and Metohia arose in 1909 when the Turkish
authorities attempted to execute a list of the population for conscription
and the collection of taxes. At the anniversary of the Revolution in 1909,
the ethnic Albanians held a congress in Debar, where the demand for
introducing military obligation was rejected, the issue of creating a
separate autonomous region encircling all territories on which ethnic
Albanians lived was brought up, and intolerance toward the neighboring
Serbian countries was expressed with acute emphasis.7
Despite gulfs in religious differences, political disagreements,
unequal economic interests, owing to the centralist measures of the Young
Turks, a high degree of national solidarity was soon attained within the
leadership of the Albanian movement. Persistent strivings of the Young Turks
to introduce military service and new taxes exacerbated ethnic Albanians of
all confessions, having been exempt of them during the reign of Abdul-hamid
II. Skirmishes between regular armies and the rebellious ethnic Albanians
soon proved the power of invincible clans, and the Young Turks were soon
compelled to concessions. The punitive expedition of Djavid Pasha in fall
1909, and the too rigorous measures in north Albania did not bring the
desired results.8
Another Albanian insurrection broke out in spring 1910, after the
repeated attempt of the authorities to collect taxes. Opposition in Kosovo
and Metohia was particularly strong in the Djakovica and Lab region. Turkish
troops, commanded by Torgut Shefket Pasha, mercilessly crushed the
insurrection and undertook to seize arms, but pacification was only a
temporary solution. Albanian committees increased agitation to create an
autonomous Albania and fomented discontent among ethnic Albanians in all
regions of the empire. Insurrections in Yemen and Lebanon, disorder in Crete
and the Italian incursion on Tripoli put the Young Turks in a difficult
position. The Malissors used the new clashes to rise in north Albania.
Montenegrin King Nikola I, in line with the Malissors, supplied the rebels
with arms and provided shelter for refugees, expecting the Albanian
insurrections to weaken Turkey. Among the 3,000 ethnic Albanians hiding in
Montenegro were leaders form Old Serbia, Isa Boljetinac and Suleyman Batusa.
A memorandum (Red Book) was sent from Cetinje to the Great Powers and the
Young Turks demanding recognition of the Albanian nation and autonomous
Albania.9
In fall 1911, Boljetinac requested arms from Serbia, and the
Montenegrin government proposed to Belgrade to aid the insurrection before
another power benefited from it. Serbian Premier Milovan Milovanovic
regarded the Albanian insurrection and its ties with Montenegro
suspiciously. Fearing that Austria-Hungary would introduce the army to
restore order in the Kosovo vilayet, Milovanovic believed that flaring the
insurrection was not in the interest to Serbs.10
The Serbs soon found themselves cleaved between the Young Turks and
ethnic Albanians. The Young Turk authorities oppressed the Serbs more
severely than the preceding ones. After the proclamation of extraordinary
conditions and drumhead court-martial (urfia) in May 1910, an action to
seize arms was executed, with many people beaten, while several Serbs died
as a result of the hits inflicted. Local tyrants made avail of the disorders
and uprisings to sack Serbian homes.11 When Sultan Mahmud V
Reshad arrived in Kosovo in summer 1911 to offer amnesty, another wave of
violence was tossed upon the Serbs. The settling of accounts was accompanied
by murders, abduction, robberies, arson and oppression. Since July to
November 1911,128 robberies, 35 arsons, 41 banditries, 53 abductions, 30
blackmails, 19 examples of frightening, 35 murders, 37 attempts to murder,
58 armed assails upon property, 27 examples of fights and abuse, 13 attempts
to Turkize and 18 examples of serious injuries inflicted were recorded in
Old Serbia.12 The disastrous extent of violence urged Serbian
consuls to make energetic demands from the government to arm the Serbs in
Kosovo again.
Yet, events rapidly followed one another. The Young Turk regime was in
a state of crisis, new elections were announced. Belgrade expected the Young
Turks would win the elections, so instructions were sent to Kosovo upon that
line. After a large conference of Serbs in Skoplje, in March 1912, a new
electoral agreement was concluded with the Young Turks. The ethnic
Albanians, exacerbated opposers of the Young Turk regime, began anew their
attacks upon the Serbs. Their chiefs urged the masses on; the frightening of
Serbs, blackmail and murders were resumed.13
The general Albanian insurrection had begun preparations in January
1912. Hasan Pristina and Ismail Kemal of south Albania supervised the
preparations. Pristina's task was to gather the people and collect the arms,
while Kemal was to contact Albanian committees and propagate Albanian
interests in European centers. It was settled that the insurrection in the
Kosovo vilayet was to begin in spring, and then it was to spread to other
regions inhabited by ethnic Albanians. In July 1912, the insurrection spread
over all of Kosovo; refusing to shoot Muslims, the rebels were joined by
officers, soldiers and gendarmes. The vali of Kosovo personally returned to
the ethnic Albanians arms seized two years before. War with Italy, uprisings
and unrest all over the empire and danger of international involvement
compelled the sultan to replace the Young Turks, dissolve the Parliament and
yield to the demands of the ethnic Albanians.
Yet, they would not surrender. Around 15,000 rebels, dissatisfied with
the pacifying promises of the sultan, moved south and took Skoplje. The
committee sent from Constantinople to enter into negotiations, was given
requests by Hasan Pristina, in the name of the insurrection, comprising 14
articles: special laws for Albania based on the common law; the right to
carry arms, amnesty for all rebels; assignment of officials who speak the
Albanian language and are familiar with their customs in four vilayets
(Kosovo, Scutari, Bitolj and Janjevo); recognition of the Albanian language
as official; curriculum and religious schools in the native tongue;
ethnic Albanians to serve in the army only on this territory; building
of roads and railtracks, additional administrative divisions; trial for the
Young Turk government. After a week of negotiating with the authorities,
which accepted most of the conditions, the rebels dispersed.14
The leadership of the insurrection was comprised of people of different
political affiliation and social status. On the one hand there were the
military commanders of the insurrection, prominent tribal chiefs and former
outlaws (Bairam Cur, Isa Boljetinac, Idriz Sefer, Riza Bey Krieziu), among
whom there were followers of the old system and Austrophils. On the other
hand, there were former diplomats and unhappy politicians (Hasan Pristina,
Jahia Aga, Hadji Rifat Aga and Nexhib Draga), who held differed views on the
future of ethnic Albanians both as compared to the first group and among
themselves. Their official petitions did not contain demands for the
territorial autonomy of ethnic Albanians, nor was the Porte ready to comply
to such a demand. Abhorring intervention of the Balkan states, Hasan
Pristina and Nexhib Draga, the major negotiators, were satisfied with the
resolution of the Albanian issue within the framework of Ottoman
legitimitism.15
The attitude of the rebels toward the political status of the Serbs in
Old Serbia was, despite individual cooperation, basically one of
intolerance. The Skoplje paper Vardar warned that the Serbs in Old Serbia
did not mind that Turkey had met with the national demands of the ethnic
Albanians: "We only think it unfair that we Serbs are excluded, whose
desires and interests, like in this case, as always, remain
heedless".16
The Serbian government strove to use the Albanian insurrection to
further weaken the Turkish system and its leadership and to drive out
Austro-Hungarian influence in its leadership. The consul of Pristina
negotiated with influential leaders - Bairam Cur, Isa Boljetinac and Riza
Bey, while sons of Boljetinac were guests of the Belgrade government. Many
leaders were paid large sums out of funds of the Serbian government or they
were given arms. Owing to this, in a draft of demands, an article was
inserted which anticipated the recognition of rights demanded by the ethnic
Albanians to apply to Serbs as well. Due to the insistence of several of the
leaders, particularly of the pro-Austrian affiliated Hasan Pristina, this
article did not enter the official Albanian requests.
The Albanian national movement felt, despite periodical aid from
Montenegro and Serbia and constant negotiations and political reliance upon
them, in the bases of its seemingly contradictory aspirations, profound
intolerance for Serbs in the Kosovo vilayet, as the most permanent
component. The fact that no one even thought of recognizing the right of the
Serbs to national institutions and independent political activity, was
displayed by the escalation of Albanian violence in 1912. Periodical
attempts of individual tribal chiefs to approach distinguished Serbian
representatives in Turkey were merely tactical acts of conformation without
permanent political importance. Intolerance toward the people which, though
thinned out, were still the majority, was exhibit in all plans and programs
of Albanian leaders. Ever since the reign of the Albanian League, until the
beginning of the second decade of the 20th century, the Serbs in Kosovo,
Metohia and the neighboring regions, were deprived of the most fundamental
rights to human freedom and even minimal civil rights. Albanian and Young
Turk confrontation, fear of the involvement of the Balkan states and
Austria-Hungary only temporarily suppressed their voluminous intentions with
the Serbs.
1 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 330-333.
2 Elaboration: D. Mikic, Mladoturski parlamentarni izbori 1908. i Srbi
u Turskoj, Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta u Pristini, XII (1975), pp.
154-209.
3 Rod narodne skupstine otomanskih Srba, Skoplje 1910; Istorija srpskog
naroda, VI/1, pp. 335-338.
4 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 335-336.
5 Zaduzbine Kosova, p. 704.
6 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, 340-342; see elaborate documentation:
B. Perunicic, Zulumi aga i begova, pp. 460-529.
7 I. G. Senkevic, Osvoboditelnoe dvizenie albanskogo naroda v 1905-1912
gg, Moskva 1959, pp.. 140-145; S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 391-394.
8 Ibid.
9 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 159-160.
10 V. Corovic, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp.
350-351;
more elaborate: B. Hrabak, Arbanaski prvak Isa Boljetinac i Crna Gora
1910-1912, Istorijski zapisi, XXXIX (1977).
11 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, 201-214; Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 707-708.
12 Zaduzbine Kosova, 716; additional documentation, pp. 717-728.
13 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1,345-347, cf. Dokumenti o spoljnoj
politici Kraljevine Srbije, V/2, Beograd 1985.
14 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski ustanci 1912, Vranjski glasnik, XI (1975), pp.
339 passim.
15 Ibid., pp. 323-324.
16 Ibid., p. 325, Serbian agent in Kosovo, renowned writer Grigorije
Bozovic, observing the Albanian movement in summer 1912, noted the
following: "The negative aspect of this movement as far as the Serbs are
concerned, is that the Arnauts are on the verge of becoming a nation, and
they wish to settle their issue in Kosovo, and that they are neither the
conquerors nor the conquered. We fall between them and the Young Turks, and
both will throw their rage at us. A positive move is that the Albanians are
beginning to unfetter themselves from Turkish fanaticism; Muslim solidarity
and hypnosis are slackening; they are very aware that they are at enmity
with the Turks and, most important, they speak of Serbia with sympathy and
regard it an amicable country." (Ibid, pp. 320.)
PART TWO: THEOCRACY, NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM

LIBERATION OF KOSOVO AND METOHIA
The development of events in Turkey, particularly war with Italy and
disorder in Old Serbia and Macedonia, had created a peculiar disposition in
the Balkan states. Albanian insurrections accelerated the conclusion of the
Balkan alliance. Since February until August, the alliance between Serbia,
Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece was definitely confirmed. Realizing the
impossibility of a peaceful solution to the Christian issue in Turkey, the
allies decided to war. Owing to Russia's diplomatic moves, Central Powers
consented to the Balkan states handling the destiny of the Balkan Peninsula.
Estimating a certain victory for the Turkish army, Austria-Hungary calmly
awaited war. The road leading to the realization of a historical mission -
the liberation of compatriots under Turkish rule, opened in autumn, 1912.
Beginning with October, the allies declared war to Turkey, the official
reason being Turkey's denial to pronounce new reforms (with concessions
equal to those given to the ethnic Albanians), the supervision of which
would have been entrusted to the Balkan states.1
Shortly before the war, Serbia endeavored to win over the ethnic
Albanians and isolate them from military operations. In a secret mission in
Kosovo, two most distinguished intelligence officers Dragutin Dimitrijevic
Apis and Bozin Simic aimed to come to an agreement with Isa Boljetinac and
Idriz Sefer for ethnic Albanians not to take part in the upcoming
war.2 Serbian Premier Nikola Pasic offered the Albanian leaders a
"contract on the association of Serbs and ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo
vilayet", whereby within the framework of the Serbian state organization,
they were warranted freedom of religion, Albanian language in schools and
society, administration of Albanian communities and administrative
districts, preservation of the common law and finally, a special Albanian
assembly to enact laws on religious, judicial and educational matters. At an
assembly held in Skoplje on October 10, (and subsequently in Pristina and
Debar), the ethnic Albanians decided to defend their Ottoman fatherland in
arms and use weapons obtained from Serbia against its army.3
Commanding the third Serbian army for action in Kosovo was General
Bozidar Jankovic, who had previous contact with the ethnic Albanians, which
might have influenced their decision. A military announcement mentioned
amiable disposition toward the ethnic Albanians providing they deserved it
through proper conduct. Yet Austro-Hungarian agitators encouraged both
Muslim and Catholic ethnic Albanians to move against the Serbian army,
promising that troops of the Dual Monarchy are on their way from Bosnia to
assist them.4
Isa Boljetinac received 63,000 guns from the Turkish authorities to
organize resistance toward the Serbian army. Despite Boljetinac's strong
agitation that "Islamism is in jeopardy", and the need to defend "Turkish
soil", only 16,000 ethnic Albanians appeared at the frontier. They were
committed with the defense of Kosovo together with a Turkish corps. Well
armed and equipped, the Serbian army advanced toward Kosovo in exaltation.
The feeling that the "Serbian covenant thought" was coming to life with the
liberation of Kosovo, bleeding five centuries under Turkish reign, had
created a remarkably high morale for combat. Identical feelings were born by
Montenegrin units advancing towards Pec and Djakovica.5
Combats with the ethnic Albanians were severe only in the first
skirmishes. The Serbian artillery easily scattered Albanian bashibazouk
companies without encountering serious resistance. Following their defeat,
Bairam Cur, Riza Bey and Isa Boljetinac fled to Albanian Malissia. After the
liberation of Pristina (October 22), and victory in Kumanovo (October
23-24), war was resolved for Old Serbia and Macedonia. In Kosovo and
Metohia, Serbs greeted the Serbian and Montenegrin armies with exhilaration.
The entire third army attended a formal liturgy at Gracanica to mark the
liberation of Kosovo. Military authorities issue