, , . , "" ( 1995 ), 1985 . ? , , , "" . , , . . , , , . , . , , . ( ): " , , , - . , , ". " ; " " , . , - "" . . " " . , "" "", , ". *** , . 24 1995 : " , . , , , , , . , - , , . , , , . 15 , , .. . . , , . , . 1991 50 , , , . , , - . , . , , , : - . , ; - . . . . , , . , , . "" . . . , : - , , ; - - ; - . , , - ". , , - , - . *** . , , , , . , , , , . . ( , ). . . - , . . . . - . . , , , . , ... *** , . , . 1994 - 1998  1992 JOINT MILITARY NET ASSESSEMENT CHAPTER 11 SPECIAL INTEREST AREAS Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Warning Intelligence The steps taken by CIS leaders to reform fundamental political, security, and economic institutions in the aftermath of the failed Moscow coup promise a new phase in global relations. Before this development in the former Soviet Union, the intelligence efforts of both East and West had continued with relatively modest changes. However, despite statements by CIS leaders about dismantling their intelligence structures and subjecting their intelligence organizations to greater public scrunity, a huge collection apparatus remains available to the political entity assuming power. Whatever intelligence services emerge from the current upheaval will most likely continue to collect against traditional military and political targets (albeit an a lower level), while redirecting their efforts to Third World security issues and economic and commercial objectives. A number of former Soviet clients states and developing countries pose effective, regionally oriented, and frequently multi-disciplined intelligence threats. Although these countries' capabilities are often technologically inferior tocounterintelligence systems of the developed West, their capabilities will improve as enhanced collection systems are developed or acquired. DOD counterdrug operations present an additional target of opportunity for counterintelligence by states or groups. Secure communications and other operations security measures will remain important for effective counterdrug operations. Counterintelligence In the post-Cold War era, the increase in personal, technical, and commercial contacts among nations has broadened substantially the opportunities for overt collection of sensitive information. Conversely, former adversaries face difficult challenges because of butgeoning East-West relations and commercial ventures, intrusive arms-control inspections, loss of internal controls and restrictions, defectors and emeigres from the East, and "volunteers" spies for the West. Little change in extant organizational structures and bilateral relationships among the Western democracies in expected, but dissipating peerceptions of remaining military threats are likely to reduce investment in counterintelligence functions. However, the potential for divergent economic interests resulting from increased global conpetitiveness may elevate the potential for intelligence threats, even from traditional allies. Thus, the United States probably will continue to experience espionage damage to plans, programs, operations, and technological advantages. Changing intelligence relationships with allies and expected cooperation with traditional adversaries pose intelligence risks. Lack of language capabilities, unfamiliarity with the lical environment, and a lack of prior relationship with indegenous counterintelligence and security services hinder the capabilities of US counterintelligence personnel deployed to nontraditional assigment lications. Warning Overall US intelligence capabilities are assessed to be good to excellent in proving information on changes in the military capabilities of potential adversaries. This military data, analyzed in the context of early political and economic indicators of an increased threat to the United States or its interests, provides the dasis for warning time assumptions. Reliably determining an adversary's exact intent remains elusive, but it is nevertheless a goal of the warning process. Warning of a specific time of attack based on military capabilities is unrealistic, as essential final political decisions are invariably the denermining factor. The future of US warning capabilities will be dependent on a number of factors. Resource constraints and personnel reductions in the Intelligence Community will have a negative effect, but the reduction in the forward presence of US forces-inevitable as the global security environment changes- will have the greatest impact on our ability to obtain timely warning of changes in the capabilities of potential adversaries.   , , . , , . , , , . , ( ), . - , . , , , . . . " " , . , , , , , - "" . , , . , , , . , , , , , , . . , , . . , , . , . , . HERBERT APTHEKER. Imperialism's Intelligence (Political Affairs). Colonel Corson, the author, comments on the Doolittle matter: "By accepting the Doolittle report Eisenhower not only embraced the idea that there was no Geneva convention to guide American conduct, but also communicated to the intelligence community from Akron to Afganistan that he was amenable to a no-holds-barred approach on their part." Less than a year later the Doolittle Report became formal U.S. policy through the adoption of National Security Council directive 5412/1, issued March 12, 1955. The essence of that directive lies in its six authorization paragraphs directed to the CIA; the latter was told to do the following (we are quoting): 1) Create and exploit problems for international communism. 2) Discredit international communism, and reduce the strength of its parties and organization. 3) Reduce international communist control over any areas of the world. 4) Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the nations of the free world... increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nations to resist international communism. 5) In accordance with established principles, and to the extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by international communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations. 6) Specifically, such operations shall include and covert activities related to: propaganda, political action, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, escape and evasion and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile stated or groups including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, support of indigenous and anticommunist elements in threatened countries of the free worls; deception plans and operations and all compatible activities necessary to accomplish the foregoing. The fact is, writes the author, that the CIA wanted "to finish the job of the Soviet Union started by Hitler." Meanwhile, by CIA of Hitlerian methods, progressive governments were overthrown in Iraq an Guatemala and the Dominican Republic and Guyana, the invasion of Cuba was undertaken and since then programs like Mongoose have subsidized sabotage, murder and - the author tells us - at least eight different attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. Other murder efforts, including one aimed at Chou En-Laiaome twenty years ago, failed, while that against Lumumba succeeded. The author sugggests that it is possible some of these murder efforts were not known to the President but he is sure Rockefeller was in on the secrets. He suggests also that there is evidence that CIA operations have degenerated in terms of responsibility; he cites, for example: "President Carter's admission that he didn't know that King Hussein of Jordan was on his (the CIA) persolak payroll." Beginning in 1948, the Colonel notes, "The CIA's Office of Policy Coordination and the Deputy Director for Plans had been engaged, without much success, in inserting agents provocateurs into Eastern European satellite countries for low-level espionage and sabotage purpose'. By the 1950s these efforts had been sophisticated and develiped into full-scale secret wars - code named Red Sox/Red Cap - having as their essential purpose the provocation of uprisings especially in Hungary, Poland an Czechoslovakia. In this period so-called defectors from these countries as well as from Rumania "were trained to become the CIA'a entry into anti-Soviet struggles" with most of this training being done in West Germany. Considerable detail - some of it new - if offered in this volume on the significant role of the CIA in the Hungarian events of 1956; the author makes explicit that the purpose at that time was the complete overthrow of the system of socialism and the restoration of the situation that prevailed prior to World War II. This will make instructive reading for those souls who insisted that the aim of that 1956 counterrevolutionary move was socialism's "purification". " , ( - .), , , , , , , , (.. -.). , N 5412/1 12 1955 . , , , : - ; - , ; - ; - , ; - , , , ; - , , , , , -, , , , , , ; , ; , ." . - , , , . I ! , "" , "". ( ) "" - "", . : . , , - . , , - , . 1994 "". : " . "... : . , , - , , , - . , , . " " - - , " ", , . ( ) , - , , , , , , . , , . , " ". , . - .. , "", " ", - , - , - - . ! , , - : " ". , , , , ? (" "), , - (""), (" ", ", "). - , , . - ( ) , " - , , ". !.. .. ": - ". .. , , : " - ". , : - . , , - .. ( ) . , : , , , , , "-". , . 1995 , "" , " " . " , "-104" 1974 , - ", - . , , "-" "", . : " : " ". ! , - : " ". , , "". "-104" - , . : - , "-104"? - . - ? - . , " ". 17 1991 .. . ( !) "" (1992 .) .. " ", , , .. . , , - . : " ". " " ( ) .. .. . , , "" (- ), ... . . 1812 .. I: - , ! - , , , . ( , "- ") - , , , . , : , , , , - " ceo"... , , "" , . " , - ", - 18 . . . " ", 24 1977 , " ". , , .. : " , , . , , . , . , , , . , , , , , . , , , . , . , , ..." , . 1975 1979 - .. . , "". .. , , - "". .. " 90- ": " ". 1995 , , . : " , : ?" - . : " - !" , ?.. - , , , . . " " 1991 . "" : " , , , "; "... . ." ( ) , " " " ". , , - . , , . , (" , , "), .. - . , 1961 . , . , , , . . " , . . , , . , . , ." - , ( !): , . . . - , . "", - . " !" - . "...". " !". - , . "" - . " !" - . ? . . . , , , . .. , " ". , , : " . , - , , -. -6. ! . "" - , . , . - ". , "" - , " " : 1937 - . . , - ? , "", (.I, .8): " , ". , . " ". , , . 500 . , " " ... "" " " , " , ", " " " " - . . "", - " " . . : " , !" , , "" ( '", 1992 .) " : . , 1994 , 5 - 7 .